"Silent Partners"
Gregory Levey, The New Republic, October 20, 2006

On Tuesday, a leading Saudi Arabian daily, Al Eqtisadiah, called on the Saudi government to follow Iran's lead and engage in the development of nuclear reactors. Just a few days earlier, Al Madina, another Saudi newspaper, urged the Kingdom to pull out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to do so. In Israel, and among Israel's supporters, many will see this sort of talk as yet another threat to the Jewish state. Saudi Arabia and Israel, after all, are not exactly considered the best of friends.

But something much more nuanced may be at play, and, in the near future, Saudi Arabia may end up being one of Israel's most important - albeit secret - allies. Today, the interests of the Israeli and Saudi governments are so aligned that they may have little choice but to work together. What's more, because the United States currently enjoys an unprecedented level of trust from both states, if it capitalizes on this situation, this convergence of interests could actually bring some major positive changes to the region. In fact, it may already be doing so.

The Israeli paper Yediot Ahronot recently reported that Jordan had hosted a secret nighttime meeting between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, (accompanied by the head of Israel's Mossad) and a member of the Saudi Royal Family. Inevitably, the Jordanians, the Israelis, and the Saudis all denied it. When I asked a former colleague of mine in the Israeli government about the meeting, I got a cagey and noncommittal response with just a hint that there might be some substance to it. Olmert himself has been far less circumspect: Pressed by an Israeli radio station on the issue, he said, "We have decided that, on this subject, I am going to deliver a denial, but you don't have to believe it. On other matters, believe all my denials."

The subject of this meeting, Yediot reported, was the threat that Iran poses to both countries. From the Saudi perspective, developing its own nuclear program may be one way to counter this threat. But cooperation with Israel may be another. Both states are threatened by the Shia ascendancy, which is led by an increasingly powerful Iran and symbolized by what was seen in the Arab world as a Hezbollah victory this past summer. For Israel, this ascendancy is a potentially mortal danger. For Saudi Arabia, it is both a physical threat (because Iran could use its growing power to destabilize the Saudi regime) and a threat to its leadership - and the dominance of its Sunni Islam - in the region. It is no coincidence that, during the war, the Saudis were almost explicitly supportive of Israel. They were hoping that Israel would eliminate the Shia Hezbollah militia and deal a blow-by-proxy to Iran.

But that's not the only thing Israel and Saudi Arabia have in common. If it hasn't already, the secret Saudi-Israeli dialogue will likely soon extend to another matter: a renewed discussion of the 2002 Saudi peace plan. Bob Woodward's new book, State of Denial, reports that a major reason President Bush initially supported a Palestinian state was because he was urged by the Saudis, who felt pressure from their people to help the Palestinians. With the challenge that Shia Islam poses to their dominance of the Arab world - and with the current sate of chaos in Ramallah - the Saudis are likely feeling the same pressure today.

Some signs from the last few weeks seem to indicate that talks could come soon about the 2002 Saudi plan for normalizing relations between Israel and the entire Arab League. According to M.J. Rosenberg of the Israel Policy Forum, at a recent event in Washington held by the American Task Force on Palestine, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki Al Faisal, seemed to be setting the stage for negotiations on the plan. He said, "In Saudi Arabia, we believe that the path to peace begins with peaceful coexistence between a Palestinian state and an Israeli state, and peace between Israel and the entire Arab world." In September, Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, the heir to the Saudi throne, brought up the proposal, insisting that it was the "correct path for the Palestinian issue." And, all this past week, Arab governments have been pressing Hamas to accept the Saudi plan after several years of letting it lay dormant.

Meanwhile, Israeli Minister Meir Sheetrit, a close ally of Olmert, recently announced that he had told Olmert to "invite the Saudis to come to Israel" to discuss the plan. Within just a few days of his alleged meeting in Jordan with the Saudis, Olmert himself said, "I am very impressed with different processes and statements that are connected to Saudi Arabia - some that have been stated publicly and others as well."

Olmert has a political interest in taking advantage of the emerging Saudi attitude. The policy for which he was elected - a unilateral withdrawal from large parts of the West Bank - has fallen entirely from his agenda, and many have suggested that he no longer has a mandate. Negotiating a revamped Saudi plan could engender a sense of purpose in his administration and keep it alive. As those who work with him know, the latter may be incentive enough to grasp the Saudis' reaching hands. (When I left my position in the prime minister's office a few months ago, one of the longtime staffers there told me that he was considering doing the same, because he felt that, while former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had real goals, Olmert's goal was "just staying in power." Another former colleague told me that the overriding sense he gets from working with Olmert is that "the most important thing to him is being prime minister.")

To be sure, there is not likely to be an open rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia anytime soon, but a hugfest is not necessarily what's needed. The Israelis and Saudis already seem to be working together behind the scenes on matters of state security; there is ample reason they could soon be working together behind the scenes on matters of peace. It's true that the Saudis fund some of Israel's worst enemies, but this may be largely to maintain their influence in the region - which is leagues better for Israel than allowing them to cede their influence to the Iranians. It's also true that, even if a reworked version of the Saudi plan were officially offered to the Israelis, they might reject it as they did in 2002. But reports in several newspapers have indicated that this new version may address the obstacles that stymied the plan from an Israeli perspective last time.

This is a strange moment for the Middle East and, as always, things could go horribly wrong. Still, the convergence of Saudi and Israeli interests could offer the region some very promising changes and, even if it doesn't seem likely at this moment (Anwar Sadat's rapprochement with Menachem Begin never seemed likely, either), it may be the only chance for peace.